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Most researchers leverage bottom-up suppression to unlock the underlying mechanisms
of unconscious processing. However, a top-down approach – for example via hypnotic
suggestion – paves the road to experimental innovation and complementary data that
afford new scientiﬁc insights concerning attention and the unconscious. Drawing from
a reliable taxonomy that differentiates subliminal and preconscious processing, we
outline how an experimental trajectory that champions top-down suppression techniques,
such as those practiced in hypnosis, is uniquely poised to further contextualize and
reﬁne our scientiﬁc understanding of unconscious processing. Examining subliminal and
preconscious methods, we demonstrate how instrumental hypnosis provides a reliable
adjunct that supplements contemporary approaches. Speciﬁcally, we provide an integrative
synthesis of the advantages and shortcomings that accompany a top-down approach to
probe the unconscious mind. Our account provides a larger framework for complementing
the results from core studies involving prevailing subliminal and preconscious techniques.
Keywords: unconscious, instrumental hypnosis, suggestion, subliminal perception, preconscious processing,
suppression of consciousness, consciousness, global workspace
INTRODUCTION
The unconscious mind fascinates and challenges human thinking
(Tallis, 2002). Pervasive even in popular science (Mlodinow,2012),
the so-called “new” unconscious shares in the innovations and
advances of consciousness research (Dehaene et al., 2006; Kouider
and Dehaene, 2007; Seth et al., 2008; Dehaene, 2011; Dehaene and
Changeux, 2011). This fast-growing ﬁeld offers novel perspectives
concerning the powerful inﬂuence of the unconscious mind on
thought and behavior (Hassin et al., 2005). In the quest to under-
stand the unconscious realm, various psychophysical techniques
that suppress conscious access to sensory events largely frame our
insights regarding the depth of unconscious processing and serve
as a robust methodological backbone (Kim and Blake, 2005). Yet,
despite such valuable methods, inconsistencies across tasks fuel
a conundrum regarding the depth of processing of the cogni-
tive unconscious – unconscious mental structures and processes
that support thoughts and behaviors (Kihlstrom, 1987). These
inconsistencies not only call for caution when generalizing results
from a single family of similar tasks, but also suggest that sup-
pression mechanisms are mostly task-dependent (Tsuchiya et al.,
2006; Faivre et al., 2014; Fogelson et al., 2014; Izatt et al., 2014).
In their attempt to identify the underlying mechanisms sub-
serving unconscious processing, researchers increasingly seek to
diversify their critical inquiry. Here we draw upon the science of
hypnosis – a technique with a long track record of study concern-
ing the unconscious – and show how it can become a useful vehicle
to complement and diversify existing empirical approaches.
Recovering from a volatile history plagued by quackery and
charlatanism, hypnosis has become a viable venue of cogni-
tive science (Oakley and Halligan, 2009, 2013; Raz, 2011b).
At least in part, this interest owes to the potent inﬂuence
hypnotic and post-hypnotic suggestions wield over sensory,
cognitive, and motor processing (Nash and Barnier, 2008). Rely-
ing on such ﬁndings, we argue that research on the cognitive
unconscious would beneﬁt from including hypnosis paradigms.
Complementing current assortment of suppression techniques
with the powerful effects of hypnosis affords researchers with
a distinctive mean to test novel hypotheses about unconscious
processing.
Using hypnosis in the study of the unconscious mind dates
back to early psychodynamic conceptions when analysts lever-
aged hypnotism to probe unconscious thoughts and feelings of
analysands (Bachner-Melman and Lichtenberg, 2001). Revisit-
ing this idea, hypnosis research informs our scientiﬁc views of
the cognitive unconscious, mental processes, and their structure
(Kihlstrom, 1987). Here we draw on this framework and out-
line how instrumental hypnosis – i.e., the instrumental use of
hypnotic suggestions to explore the underlying mechanisms of
typical and atypical cognition – promises to make way for a top-
down approach in the study of unconscious processes. Speciﬁcally,
this top-down approach aims to harness the effects of higher
cognitive functions upon lower level processing. We argue that
instrumental hypnosis paves the road to multiple methodological
advances in the exploration of the unconsciousmind.We differen-
tiate between subliminal and preconscious approaches (Dehaene
et al., 2006; Dehaene, 2011), whereby the former reﬂects per-
ceptual failures and the latter attentional failures (Kanai et al.,
2010). We will explain how hypnotic suggestions can exploit the
mechanisms of suppression and inattention to unravel uncon-
scious processes. Importantly, this innovative framework does not
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champion top-downover bottom-up approaches, but rather advo-
cates exploiting both approaches together to better unravel the
complexity of unconscious processing.
We review contemporary suppression and inattention tech-
niques to assess their relative merits and drawbacks. There-
after, we contrast the strengths and weaknesses of contempo-
rary approaches – i.e., subliminal and preconscious methods –
with those of instrumental hypnosis. Showcasing ﬁndings using
hypnosis, we sketch out how this top-down approach provides
the experimental means to foster new perspectives to study the
unconscious mind.
PART I – MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF THE UNCONSCIOUS
MIND AND THE GLOBAL WORKSPACE THEORY OF
CONSCIOUSNESS
Subliminal and preconscious approaches represent active areas
of research within the domain of unconscious cognition (Kim
and Blake, 2005; Kouider and Dehaene, 2007; Jensen et al., 2011).
Guided by various techniques designed to eliminate conscious
access of sensory events (KimandBlake,2005), subliminal research
gave way to the emergence of different theories (Hassin et al.,
2005). Critically, conceptions of the unconscious mind remain
largely contingent on current theories of consciousness: engaging
unconscious perception entails disrupting at least one mechanism
that would otherwise enable conscious perception (Dehaene et al.,
2006; Kanai et al., 2010; Dehaene, 2011; Dehaene and Changeux,
2011). In the global workspace theory of consciousness, the pro-
gression from unconsciousness to consciousness proceeds from
the coordinated interplay between multiple local systems form-
ing an overarching network. More speciﬁcally, this model posits
that conscious perception stems from the bottom-up propagation
of sensory signals across various systems, while top-down pro-
cesses boost the strength of these signals, enabling global broadcast
of information through a virtual forum (Baars, 1988, 2005;
Dehaene et al., 1998, 2001, 2003, 2006; Dehaene and Naccache,
2001; Dehaene and Changeux, 2005, 2011; Del Cul et al., 2007;
Dehaene, 2011). Therefore, according to this account, conscious-
ness corresponds to a stable state that emerges from the coher-
ent and synchronous activities among distant local processing
systems.
The global workspace model entails that unconscious process-
ing of sensory events occurs in two ways: conscious suppression of
sensory signals, corresponding to perceptual failures, and precon-
scious processing of sensory events reﬂecting attentional failures
(see Figure 1; Dehaene et al., 2006; Kanai et al., 2010; Dehaene
and Changeux, 2011). During suppression, interruptions of the
sensory signal can potentially occur at different stages of sen-
sory processing, leading to subliminal processing. For example,
backward masking – a common suppression technique – likely
achieves suppression of consciousness by interfering with local
boosting processes of sensory signals, which reduces its overall
efﬁciency for global broadcast (Kouider and Dehaene, 2007). Dur-
ing preconscious processing, various techniques divert attention
and top-down ampliﬁcation processes away from sensory events,
thereby preventing global broadcast of information and conscious
perception. Several experiments report that individuals remain
unaware of unattended events (Simons and Levin, 1997; Mack
FIGURE 1 | Contemporary approaches and the hypnotic approach as a
function of the taxonomy that differentiates subliminal processing,
reflecting perceptual failures, from preconscious processing, reflecting
attentional failures. During subliminal processing: contemporary
approaches utilize bottom-up competition between sensory inputs to
exploit the limits of perception, prevent global broadcast of incoming
signals and induce conscious suppression; while the hypnotic approach
harness top-down processes to modulate lower perceptual processes and
suppress sensory inputs. During preconscious processing: both
contemporary approaches and the hypnotic approach prevent global
broadcast by hindering top-down ampliﬁcation of incoming sensory signals.
and Rock, 1998; Simons, 2000). Apart from providing signiﬁcant
information about the inﬂuences of subliminal and preconscious
processing on cognitions and behaviors, both approaches show
that understanding the inner workings of the unconscious mind
may echo our views on consciousness. Here we unravel the merits
and drawbacks of suppression and inattention techniques through
the lens of the global workspace model while putting forward
the idea that hypnosis may contribute and extend the range of
experimental possibilities to study conscious suppression and the
unconscious mind.
PART II – CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF
THE COGNITIVE UNCONSCIOUS
SUBLIMINAL SUPPRESSION TECHNIQUES – PERCEPTUAL FAILURES
Interocular suppression techniques
Interocular suppression refers to an assortment of psychophys-
ical techniques that induce conscious suppression of sensory
input through the simultaneous dichoptic presentation of dis-
similar stimuli (see Figure 2). In this procedure, both stimuli
compete to access consciousness, resulting in the temporary
conscious suppression of the ineffective stimulus (Blake, 2001;
Blake and Logothetis, 2002; Lin and He, 2009; Blake et al., 2014).
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FIGURE 2 | Subliminal techniques. A sketch of the prevailing techniques
used to suppress conscious perception of sensory inputs. (A1) Binocular
rivalry where dichoptic presentation of dissimilar stimuli generates ﬂuctuation
in conscious perception between representations. (A2) Continuous ﬂash
suppression where presentation a repeatedly ﬂashed stimulus to one eye
induces conscious suppression of static stimulus presented in the other
eye.(B) Backward masking where rapid sequential presentation of a prime
and a mask conscious induces conscious suppression of the prime. (C) Visual
crowding where ﬂankers interfere with processing of the target in peripheral
vision, rendering certain target-related characteristics unrecognizable.
(D) Bistable ﬁgures induce perceptual ﬂuctuations between mutually
exclusive visual interpretations – e.g., side A facing upward and then facing
downward. (E) Motion-induced blindness where movement of the global
pattern suppresses conscious perception of the targets.
During binocular rivalry (BR), participants experience transient,
yet unpredictable, switches between perceptions of each monoc-
ular stimulus. Flash suppression (Wolfe, 1984) and continuous
ﬂash suppression (CFS; Tsuchiya and Koch, 2005) techniques aid
to overcome this particular shortcoming by governing stimulus
onset, thus controlling perceptual dominance and visual aware-
ness. During CFS, experimenters repeatedly ﬂash a single monoc-
ular stimulus – i.e., typically high contrast Mondrian patterns –
to induce steadier perceptual dominance (See Figure 2), which
elicits longer and deeper suppression compared to BR (Tsuchiya
et al., 2006). Evidence suggests that adaptation represents a cen-
tral mechanism of perceptual suppression (Kang and Blake, 2010).
Some propose that greater suppression during CFS follows from
the reduction of neural adaptation (Tsuchiya et al., 2006; Yang and
Blake, 2012). However, it remains unclear whether CFS merely
represents a form of BR (Tsuchiya et al., 2006; Shimaoka and
Kaneko, 2011). Plus, a recent review of BR casts doubts con-
cerning the potential of this technique to provide researchers
with critical information about consciousness (Blake et al., 2014).
This review underscores concerns related to the validity of control
conditions for BR, the distinction between attention and aware-
ness during BR, the generalizability of ﬁndings with BR, and the
comparison between the neural correlates of BR and the neu-
ral correlates of consciousness (NCC). Indeed, according to the
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authors, instead of indicating the neural mechanisms involved in
awareness, multistable techniques – and ensuing transient percep-
tual changes – could be highlighting perceptual decision processes.
In accordance with this criticism, CFS has widely gained in popu-
larity (cf., this Frontiers in Psychology research topic on conscious
suppression). Importantly, interocular suppression techniques
yield competition at the sensory level and at the representational
level (Sterzer et al., 2009b), presumably reﬂecting correspond-
ing changes a the neural level (Sterzer et al., 2014). Accordingly,
most accounts explain interocular suppression of consciousness
through inhibitory competition at different levels of processing –
i.e., lower-level sensory signal and higher-level representations
(Tong et al., 2006). This family of techniques provides the critical
advantage of inducing suppression under constant visual input,
a methodological feature that permits more reliable comparisons
of conscious and unconscious perception without confounding
variables related to changes in sensory events.
Backward masking
A popular suppression approach, visual backward masking elim-
inates conscious access through rapid sequential presentations of
stimuli – a prime target and a mask – that result in the con-
scious suppression of the prime target (see Figure 2; Breitmeyer,
2007; Kouider and Dehaene, 2007). Subliminal processing of
masked primes show perceptual, cognitive, and ideomotor effects
(Breitmeyer and Ögmen, 2006). A dominant view on backward
masking proposes that the mask stimulus suppresses conscious
access by interfering with local re-entrant signals that boost
sensory signals (Breitmeyer, 2007). Thus, by interrupting this
boosting process, masking weakens the sensory signal, render-
ing it impotent for global broadcast and conscious perception
(Dehaene et al., 2006; Dehaene and Changeux, 2011). Critically
masking reliably interrupts conscious access to sensory signals,
yet suppression remains sensitive to various prime-related and
experimental-related factors, such as the type of task, novelty of
the prime, category of the prime, etc. (Van den Bussche et al.,
2009b). Despite advantageous experimental qualities such as ﬂexi-
bility, generalizability, and robustness, backward masking achieves
conscious suppression through the disruption of the visual input –
i.e., mask interference. This drawback precludes direct contrast
between the conscious and unconscious conditions, which differ
in sensory processing, thereby limiting our ability to tease apart
the NCC with this approach.
Visual crowding
In peripheral vision, nearby distractors – e.g., ﬂankers – render
targets unrecognizable (see Figure 2; Cavanagh, 2001; Levi, 2008;
Whitney and Levi, 2011). This crowding phenomenon aids in
uncovering the underlying mechanisms of conscious recogni-
tion and object identiﬁcation (Levi, 2008; Whitney and Levi,
2011). Critically, crowding rarely abolishes conscious access to
sensory inputs because target detection remains largely unaf-
fected (Pelli et al., 2004). Instead, crowding capitalizes on the
poor resolution of peripheral vision combined with competing
noise – e.g., from the ﬂankers – to make the features of the tar-
get less discernible (Nandy and Tjan, 2007). The lack of complete
suppression of awareness highlights the difﬁculty in separating
subliminal perception from consciousness (Kim and Blake, 2005).
Also, similar to backward masking, visual crowding elicits sup-
pression of consciousness through variations of sensory input –
i.e., by adding ﬂankers – which further limits our ability to iso-
late the NCC. Different theories currently compete to explain the
effects of visual crowding. According to one such account, the
suppression of certain target features proceeds from multilevel
interactions comprising a bottleneck situated between lower level
features detection and higher order integration processes (Parkes
et al., 2001; Levi, 2008; Whitney and Levi, 2011). Supporting this
view, the effect of this bottleneck at the integration level shows
that targets can systematically acquire certain distractor-related
features (Greenwood et al., 2010). These ﬁndings suggest a central
tendency of the visual system to search for greater consistency
under visual constraints, such as those imposed by peripheral
vision (Balas et al., 2009; Greenwood et al., 2009; Dakin et al.,
2010). In this fashion, instead of combining imprecise infor-
mation to form an inadequate visual representation, the visual
system converges toward a more coherent representation by sub-
tracting uneven information. In line with this multilevel account,
previous studies have found distractor-related effects for both ele-
mentary features and whole object representations (Whitney and
Levi, 2011). These accounts deem unlikely that this bottleneck
acts upon a single and unique stage of visual processing (Levi,
2008).
Bistable ﬁgures
Bistable ﬁgures – e.g., Necker Cube and duck–rabbit ﬁgure – are
ambiguous images that induce involuntary ﬂuctuations between
mutually exclusive interpretations. For example, staring at the
Necker Cube leads to sequential changes between two perceptual
views – i.e., the frontal face either oriented downward or upward
(see Figure 2). Bistable representations reﬂect the inherent ambi-
guity conveyed by these images as our brain processes resolve
these competing interpretations (Leopold and Logothetis, 1999;
Kornmeier and Bach, 2012; Ishizu, 2013). Similar to interocular
suppression, these ﬁgures elicit changes in visual awareness while
keeping the sensory input constant. Moreover, because bistable
interpretations are mutually exclusive, the perceptual dominance
of one interpretation over the other leads to the complete sup-
pression of the other one, giving researchers effective means
to investigate subliminal perception. Despite its effectiveness in
eliminating conscious perception, an overarching shortcoming
permeates this approach: the perceptual switches triggered by
ambiguous ﬁgures are scantily under the complete voluntary con-
trol of participants, reducing experimental control (Kornmeier
and Bach, 2006).
It remains uncertain whether perceptual switches hinge on
bottom-up or top-down mechanisms (Rach and Huster, 2014).
Recognizing evidence favoring both views, hybrid accounts
attempt to bridge effects related to bottom-up sensory processing,
such as adaptation and fatigue, with top-down higher order pro-
cessing, like anticipatory and learning factors (Long and Toppino,
2004; Toppino and Long, 2005). Speciﬁcally, the relative inabil-
ity for individuals to exert total control over perceptual switches
reﬂects bottom-up processing, whereas the capacity for observers
to intentionally inﬂuence these switches demonstrates the effect
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of top-down processing. This view therefore emphasizes that per-
ceptual switches stem from multilevel interactions between both
lower sensory (e.g., Long et al., 1992) and higher cognitive pro-
cessing (Raz et al., 2007; Knapen et al., 2011; Weilnhammer et al.,
2013).
Motion-induced blindness
In motion-induced blindness, salient visual stimuli surrounded by
global moving patterns intermittently vanish from visual aware-
ness when participants stare at one location and covertly attend to
the disappearing stimuli (see Figure 2; Bonneh et al., 2001). Sim-
ilar to interocular suppression and bistable perception, the high
experimental value of this approach largely rests on its ability
to fully suppress conscious perception while keeping the sen-
sory input constant (Scholvinck and Rees, 2009). Suppression of
conscious perception through such means remains largely unpre-
dictable as multiple factors modulate the effect (e.g., Kawabe et al.,
2007; Scholvinck and Rees, 2009). Evidence suggests that suppres-
sion of perception under motion-induced blindness is unlikely to
result in the pinpointing of a circumscribed brain locus (Donner
et al., 2013). Supporting amultilevel account, variousmechanisms
have been investigated – e.g., adaptation and persistent inhibition
(Gorea and Caetta, 2009), motion streak suppression (Wallis and
Arnold, 2009), perceptual ﬁll-in (Hsu et al., 2006), or depth per-
ception ordering and surface completion (Graf et al., 2002). At
the neural level, corresponding ﬂuctuation of brain activity sug-
gests that variations in conscious perception originate from the
on-going competition between the ventral and dorsal pathways,
which engage in recognition and spatial processing, respectively
(Donner et al., 2008). These ﬂuctuations appear to proceed from
the competition between processing of the static targets and of the
moving mask.
The depth of subliminal processing
Subliminal perception shows that the enduring inﬂuence of sup-
pressed stimuli spans multiple levels of processing, including
the perceptual, lexical, semantic and social. Different subliminal
approaches reveal that suppression hardly affects superﬁcial level
of visual processing, such as spatial frequency, motion-direction,
color, and orienting (Long and Toppino, 2004; Breitmeyer and
Ögmen, 2006; Breitmeyer, 2007; Whitney and Levi, 2011; Yang
and Blake, 2012; Kramer et al., 2013). A more complex picture has
emerged concerning deeper levels of subliminal processing (van
Gaal and Lamme, 2012). Shaping our views concerning the cogni-
tive unconscious, subliminal processing occurs both at the cortical
and subcortical level (Naccache et al., 2005). However, inconsis-
tencies across tasks uncover task-speciﬁc differences (e.g., Faivre
et al., 2012, 2014; Fogelson et al., 2014; Izatt et al., 2014). More-
over, certain discrepancieswithin task suggest that task-related and
stimuli-related factors inﬂuence the depth of subliminal process-
ing (e.g., CFS, Costello et al., 2009; Kang et al., 2011). We should
therefore avoid to immediately reconsider the notion that cer-
tain subliminal approaches do not engage unconscious semantic
processing (Gayet et al., 2014). Yet, various ﬁndings indicate that
the brain subliminally processes semantic information (Costello
et al., 2009; Van den Bussche et al., 2009a; Yeh et al., 2012; San-
guinetti et al., 2013). Likewise, evidence also indicates subliminal
processing of faces and affective facial expressions (Jiang et al.,
2007; Henson et al., 2008; Kouider et al., 2009; Sterzer et al., 2009a;
Adams et al., 2010; Faivre et al., 2012; Doi and Shinohara, 2013;
Izatt et al., 2014). Overall, suppression techniques have propelled a
research trajectory that encompasses a large body of results. These
ﬁndings indicate that unconscious processing cuts across multi-
ple cognitive systems, emphasizing the critical role of unconscious
processing. Therefore, the variety of suppression techniques often
proves useful despite certain limitations.
PRECONSCIOUS SUPPRESSION TECHNIQUES – FAILURES OF
ATTENTION
Inattentional blindness and change blindness
Unattended, salient but unexpected events may go unnoticed
(Simons and Chabris, 1999; Simons, 2000). Coined inattentional
blindness (IB), these failures to detect prominent task-irrelevant
stimuli occur when individuals engage in a demanding cogni-
tive task (Mack and Rock, 1998). Similarly, inattentive observers
can stay unaware of important changes in visual scenes, a phe-
nomenon called change blindness (CB; Simons and Levin, 1997).
The effects of IB primarily stem from orienting attention toward
task-relevant events, preventing perceptual awareness of unat-
tended events (Simons, 2000). Previous studies outline that several
factors mediate the effects of IB, including the visual saliency and
spatial locationof ignored events (e.g., Koivisto et al., 2004), expec-
tations and attentional set of the observer (e.g., Most, 2013), the
difﬁculty of the primary-task and individual expertise (Memmert,
2006; Cartwright-Finch and Lavie, 2007), as well as inhibitory
mechanisms near the fringe of the attentional spotlight (Thakral
and Slotnick, 2010). CB, on the other hand, largely rests on
interactions between attention, perception and visual short-term
memory (Simons and Rensink, 2005).
Inattentional blindness (IB) and CB mainly reﬂect lapses of
attention, wherein unattended signals lack the necessary energy
and sustainability to reach conscious perception (Dehaene et al.,
2006; Dehaene, 2011; Dehaene and Changeux, 2011). Both exper-
imental techniques therefore rely on attentional failures instead of
suppressive means (Kanai et al., 2010). Supporting this account,
neurophysiological studies report that change detection correlates
with modulation of the N2pc, an electrophysiological marker of
selective attention (Eimer, 1996; Robitaille and Jolicoeur, 2006;
Kiss et al., 2008; Mazza et al., 2009;Woodman et al., 2009); whereas
the absence of modulation of the N2pc relates to CB (Eimer
and Mazza, 2005; Busch et al., 2009; however, see Schankin and
Wascher, 2007). Together, these results imply that the top-down
ampliﬁcation processes of selective attention prompt conscious
perception of changes in the display. Conversely, in the absence of
these ampliﬁcation processes, sensory inputs of changes remain
largely unconscious. In line with these reports, brain imaging
studies of CB reveal decreased frontoparietal activity (Beck et al.,
2001), a cortical network often linked with attentional processing
(Corbetta et al., 2008). In addition, temporary disruption of the
right parietal cortex with repetitive transcranial magnetic stim-
ulation (rTMS) signiﬁcantly impairs change detection abilities
and increases CB (Beck et al., 2006; Tseng et al., 2010). Along-
side attentional processing, the parietal region also associates with
visual short-term memory (Berryhill and Olson, 2008). While the
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relationship between attention and conscious perception remains
difﬁcult to construe (van Boxtel et al., 2010; Tallon-Baudry, 2011;
Chica et al., 2013), empirical ﬁndings with IB and CB techniques
strongly hint that top-down ampliﬁcation processes play a central
role in becoming aware of sensory events.
Unattended events during IB and CB induce preconscious pro-
cessing, yielding priming effects (e.g., Silverman and Mack, 2006),
implicit processing of spatial information (Lathrop et al., 2011)
and aversive stimuli (Wiemer et al., 2013), or tacitly inﬂuencing
decision processes (Laloyaux et al., 2008). Markedly, unattended
events during IB and CB induce frontal activity, suggesting deep
processing despite inattention (Pessoa and Ungerleider, 2004;
Thakral, 2011). However, neurophysiological results of precon-
scious processing remain ambiguous: whereas some studies report
a fronto-central positive deﬂection indexing preconscious process-
ing of unattended events (Fernandez-Duque et al., 2003; Kimura
et al., 2008), results from other studies hardly show any elec-
trophysiological component speciﬁc to preconscious processing
during CB (Fernandez-Duque et al., 2003; Eimer and Mazza, 2005;
Henderson and Orbach, 2006; Pourtois et al., 2006). Several task-
related shortcomings limit the application of IB and CB (Kim and
Blake, 2005). Importantly, once a participant learns or suspect that
the display may contain otherwise covert task-irrelevant stimuli,
it largely reduces the likelihood of IB and CB (Jensen et al., 2011).
This issue proves particularly challenging for IB when researchers
probe participants about the detection of covert events, immedi-
ately hinting the presence of concealed elements and invalidating
repeated testing (Kim and Blake, 2005). This concern reduces the
overall number of trials available. However, despite this liability,
both IB andCB apply to a vast range of stimuli. Furthermore, these
techniques possess great ecological validity, as failure to attend and
detect conspicuous events reproduces outside the laboratory (e.g.,
Simons and Levin, 1998).
Attentional blink
In a stream of rapidly presented visual stimuli, attending to a
task-related stimulus impairs attentional processing of subsequent
stimuli at short latencies (Raymond et al., 1992). This atten-
tional blink (AB) leads to a marked decrease in performance that
underscores the limit of attentional processing and often leaves
participants unaware of unattended stimuli (Shapiro et al., 1997b).
Converging evidence suggest that AB largely reﬂects limitations of
attentional capacity (for review, see Martens and Wyble, 2010).
Deployed attentional resources toward the primary target tempo-
rally impede ensuing attentional processing of incoming sensory
signal (Dux and Marois, 2009). Supporting this view, evidence
show that greater resources devoted toward processing of the ﬁrst
target increase the magnitude of the AB (Arnell et al., 2007). Con-
trary to IB and CB, expectations hardly modulate AB, making
it a highly reliable experimental design (Kim and Blake, 2005).
Deep processing of non-reported targets accompanies AB. For
example, unattendedwords facilitate ensuingprocessingof seman-
tically related words (Shapiro et al., 1997a; Martens et al., 2002).
Neurophysiological results also indicate that non-reported items
yieldmodulations of theN400, an electrophysiological component
indexing semantic processing (Luck et al., 1996; Rolke et al., 2001;
however, see Batterink et al., 2010). However, evidence suggests
that enduring preconscious processing of semantics during AB
remains contingent to task demands (Giesbrecht et al., 2007). Neu-
roimaging results of AB indicate that unattended stimuli activate
occipitotemporal regions in the near-absence of frontal activity
(Marois et al., 2004; Kranczioch et al., 2005; Marti et al., 2012).
In addition, brain injury to the parietal region increases the AB
(Husain et al., 1997; Shapiro et al., 2002). Despite the robustness
of the AB effects, this methodological paradigm relies on variation
of stimuli and temporal constraints. Moreover, since these effects
occur within a narrow and precise time window, researchers can
hardly test them outside the laboratory. Overall, the AB represents
a reliable task to investigate the underlying top-down mechanisms
gating access to conscious perception in a tightly controlled fashion
(e.g., Sergent et al., 2005).
HYPNOSIS AS AN ADJUNCT TO SUBLIMINAL AND PRECONSCIOUS
APPROACHES
Subliminal approaches exploit the limits of perception to sup-
press awareness of sensory events (Dehaene et al., 2006; Kanai
et al., 2010; Dehaene and Changeux, 2011). These techniques
mainly utilize competition between perceptual processing of sen-
sory signals or representations to induce unawareness, wherein
the dominance of a sensory signal or a representation prompts
the suppression of subdominant ones (Blake and Logothetis,
2002). Importantly, while attentional processing moderates sub-
liminal processing (Naccache et al., 2002; Kiefer andBrendel, 2006;
Kiefer and Martens, 2010; Martens et al., 2011), conscious sup-
pression hardly involves top-down factors. Instead, the effects of
subliminal processing stem from weakened sensory signals and
subdominant perceptual representations. Accordingly, subliminal
approaches hinge on perceptual failures. Conversely, preconscious
approaches rests on the disruption of top-down ampliﬁcation
processes, thereby preventing conscious access to sensory events
(Naccache et al., 2002; Dehaene et al., 2006; Kanai et al., 2010). As
a result, this approach may involve the processing of sensory sig-
nals strong enough for global broadcast, yet these signals remain
incapable of surpassing the threshold of consciousness without
the necessary top-down ampliﬁcation (Dehaene et al., 2006). In
this way, preconscious processing reﬂects attentional failures. The
distinction between subliminal and preconscious approaches rep-
resents a reliable taxonomyof unconscious processing basedon the
differences between perceptual and attentional failures (Figure 1;
Kanai et al., 2010).
The broad range of mechanisms selectively engaged by each of
the abovementionedmethods challenges our capacity to generalize
ﬁndings across different tasks. As we explained, these techniques
yield important ﬁndings about the scope and depth of sublimi-
nal and preconscious processing. Notably, bottom-up approaches
afford researchers with plentiful experimental control, yet offer
limited ecological validity. Conversely, top-down approaches, such
as IB and CB, propose an ecological tactic to investigate uncon-
scious processing (Simons and Levin, 1997; Simons, 2000; Simons
and Rensink, 2005; Jensen et al., 2011), but remain experimentally
challenged by top-down factors. For example, the popular invisible
gorilla paradigm represents a compelling framework that general-
izes to everyday tasks (Simons and Chabris, 1999), yet suffers from
limited empirical control and methodological practicality (Kim
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and Blake, 2005). These key observations shape the trajectory of
current research on subliminal and preconscious research. More-
over, they raise important empirical and theoretical questions
about our ability to bridge the gap between these different meth-
ods. Here we submit that instrumental hypnosis – a top-down
approach,which relies onhigher cognitive functions regulating the
downstream operations of the perceptual and affective systems –
offers new investigative prospects to elucidate the unconscious
mind. Moreover we argue that this unique approach transcends
the subliminal versus preconscious taxonomy, as hypnosis can
induce perceptual and attentional failures. Overall, hypnosis pro-
vides the means to replicate established ﬁndings and explore new
hypotheses.
To assess the aforementioned techniques (see Figure 3), we
follow the criteria put forth in the literature (Kim and Blake,
2005). This set of criteria evaluates the efﬁcacy of each tech-
nique and gauges the potential of experimental methods to
generate reliable and valid ﬁndings concerning unconscious
processes:
(i) Generality: whether the technique applies to a broad range
of stimuli or only to a select few.
(ii) Stimulus location: whether the stimulus has to be presented
at the center or the periphery of the visual ﬁeld.
FIGURE 3 | Strengths and weaknesses of contemporary techniques to
investigate unconscious perception and instrumental hypnosis as a
function of evaluation criteria. Generality : whether the technique applies
to a broad range of stimuli or only to a selected few. Location of stimulus:
whether the stimulus has to be presented at the center or the periphery of
the visual ﬁeld to induce conscious suppression or inattention.Temporal
constraint : whether the technique imposes a temporal constraint relative to
the duration of the stimulus presentation. Robustness: whether the
technique completely abolishes awareness. Invariant stimulation: whether
conscious suppression requires signiﬁcant modiﬁcations of sensory events
to make a stimulus invisible. A “” indicates that the technique meets this
particular criterion, whereas an “×” indicates that the technique fails to
meet this particular criterion.
(iii) Temporal constraint : whether the technique imposes a
temporal constraint relative to the duration of the stimulus
presentation.
(iv) Robustness: whether this technique completely abolishes
awareness.
(v)Invariant stimulation: whether conscious suppression
requires signiﬁcantmodiﬁcationsof sensory events tomake a stim-
ulus invisible – e.g., adding amask to induce conscious suppression
during backward masking.
PART III – USING HYPNOSIS TO INVESTIGATE THE
UNCONSCIOUS MIND
HYPNOSIS: A TOP-DOWN APPROACH TO INVESTIGATE THE
UNCONSCIOUS MIND
Hypnosis represents an increasingly popular area of research in
cognitive science, including notable ventures in the domains of
perception, attention, memory, and motor control (Nash and
Barnier, 2008). For example, hypnotic suggestions represent cen-
tral vehicles in exploring the notion of automatic processing and
induce de-automatization of ballistic responses in the Stroop,
McGurk, and Simon effects (Raz et al., 2002, 2005; Iani et al., 2006;
Lifshitz et al., 2013; Déry et al., 2014). Within this growing ﬁeld
of research, scholars and clinicians conceptualize the scientiﬁc
investigation of hypnosis in a dichotomous fashion, differentiating
intrinsic research on hypnosis, which focuses on the phenomenon
itself, from an instrumental approach, where researchers employ
hypnosis as an experimental tool to investigate cognition (Oakley
and Halligan, 2009, 2013). Our view focuses on supplement-
ing current experimental methodologies with this instrumental
strategy to further unravel the cognitive unconscious.
Theoretical frameworks for hypnosis largely cluster around the
appellations of state andnon-statemodels. State theories posit that
hypnosis implies a particular psychological state – e.g., an altered
state of consciousness – whereas non-state theories typically argue
that hypnosis essentially reduces to sociocognitive factors such
as motivation and compliance (Kirsch and Lynn, 1995; Kallio
and Revonsuo, 2003; Kirsch, 2011; Raz, 2011a; Mazzoni et al.,
2013). In spite of this conceptual distinction, the use of hypnosis
often includes an induction phase to increase mental absorption
followed by a suggestion phase providing directions to elicit par-
ticular changes in thoughts and behaviors. Hypnotic responses
usually result from hypnotic suggestions. The degree of respon-
siveness to hypnotic suggestions represents a robust measure with
normal distribution and high test-retest reliability (Piccione et al.,
1989). Highly hypnotically suggestible individuals (HHSs), as
opposed to low hypnotically suggestible individuals (LHSs), char-
acteristically respond to “cognitive” suggestions – i.e., suggestions
that involve changes in perception and memory (Kirsch et al.,
1999). Accordingly, researchers often compare the performances
of HHSs and LHSs to demonstrate the effects of hypnosis (Nash
and Barnier, 2008).
Top-down regulatory processes – e.g., attention, cognitive con-
trol and monitoring – play a central role in mediating responses
to hypnotic suggestions (Crawford, 1994; Gruzelier, 1998; Raz,
2004, 2011b; Egner and Raz, 2007; Dienes, 2012; Lifshitz et al.,
2012; Dienes and Hutton, 2013). Speciﬁcally, hypnosis modulates
top-down processes to dramatically change the implementation
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of cognitive strategies during hypnotic responses (Egner and Raz,
2007). Furthermore, the execution of hypnotic responses often
appears dissociated from voluntary control, as they generally
feel involuntary and effortless (Spanos et al., 1977). This phe-
nomenological aspect represents a critical component of hypnotic
phenomena (Kirsch and Lynn, 1998). A family of prevalent theo-
ries contends that this central property of hypnosis mainly reﬂects
decoupling between cognitive control and monitoring processes
(cf., Jamieson andWoody,2007;Woody andSadler,2008). Accord-
ing to this view, hypnosis not only alters cognitive control but
also modiﬁes the supervision of these control processes. Support-
ing this view, a neuroimaging study of HHSs report a functional
disconnection between the lateral prefrontal cortex, often linked
to cognitive control processes, and the anterior cingulate cortex
(ACC), a brain region associatedwith cognitivemonitoring (Egner
et al., 2005). This ﬁnding echoes numerous brain imagining stud-
ies of hypnosis that show similar modulations of the ACC in the
absence of speciﬁc hypnotic suggestion (Faymonville et al., 2000,
2003; Rainville et al., 2002;McGeownet al., 2009;Vanhaudenhuyse
et al., 2009; Deeley et al., 2012; Müller et al., 2012, 2013).
Emphasizing the importance of individual variability, com-
pliant participants frequently report using different cognitive
strategies to successfully respond to the very same suggestion
(McConkey et al., 1989; Heap et al., 2004). This inter-individual
variability in hypnotic responses raises questions concerning the
link between speciﬁc cognitive styles and hypnotic susceptibil-
ity, which hints that speciﬁc sub-types of cognitive proﬁles could
enable greater hypnotic responses (Terhune et al., 2011; Brown
and Oakley, 2004). In this respect, some scholars argue that what
characterizes HHSs is their greater cognitive ﬂexibility (Crawford,
1994; Gruzelier, 1998); others regard the improvement in attention
and inhibitory control as a near-universal outcome (Dienes et al.,
2009; Varga et al., 2011). Supporting the cognitive ﬂexibility view,
neuroimagingﬁndings fromHHSs show increased functional con-
nectivity between the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), a
cortical region strongly associated with cognitive control, and
saliency networks, which likely mediate somatic, automatic, and
emotional information (Hoeft et al., 2012). However, a recent
study report that temporary disruption of the DLPFC with rTMS
also causes modiﬁcations of hypnotic responses, hinting that
hypnosis could reﬂect the disruption of cognitive control and
monitoring (Dienes and Hutton, 2013). Resting-state brain imag-
ing studies show that HHSs show decreased activity in the anterior
part of default mode network (DMN), a brain network negatively
correlated with goal-directed activity (McGeown et al., 2009).
Reduced activity in the anterior part of DMN may therefore indi-
cate a propensity to engage in goal-driven behaviors – i.e., the
mental preparation to comply with hypnotic suggestions and pro-
duce hypnotic responses. Other studies also report a signiﬁcant
change in DMN activity related to hypnosis (Demertzi et al., 2011;
Deeley et al., 2012; Lipari et al., 2012). Taken together, these cumu-
lative ﬁndings intimate the importance of top-down regulatory
functions in hypnotic phenomena.
HYPNOSIS AS A VEHICLE TO UNCOVER THE UNCONSCIOUS MIND
Hypnotic suggestions divide as a function of type and content
(see Figure 4; Woody and Sadler, 2008). Within this frame-
work, suggestions either facilitate or suppress cognitions and
behaviors. For example, facilitation may yield hallucinations (e.g.,
Bryant and Mallard, 2003), whereas suppression can interfere
with consciousness (e.g., Bryant and Kourch, 2001). Accordingly,
researchers can test conscious and unconscious processing in a
fully orthogonal manner (see Figure 5), a signiﬁcant experimental
beneﬁt to better isolate the NCC. The content of hypnotic sugges-
tions selectively targets speciﬁc mental functions and behaviors.
Thus, we will demonstrate how hypnosis encompasses a wide
variety of experimental possibilities to investigate unconscious
processes (Oakley andHalligan,2009,2013; Cox andBarnier,2010;
Bortolotti et al., 2012). Importantly, because hypnotic sugges-
tions can either induce suppression of consciousness or inﬂuence
attentional processing to impede top-down ampliﬁcation, this
top-down approach bridge the subliminal versus preconscious
dichotomy (see Figure 1). Here we discuss several avenues based
on such research developments.
Sensation and perception
Hypnosis selectively targets and modiﬁes perception of sensory
events. For example, it can alter perception of colors (Kosslyn
et al., 2000; Mallard and Bryant, 2001; Spiegel, 2003; McGe-
own et al., 2009; Kallio and Koivisto, 2013; Koivisto et al., 2013),
induce compelling experiences of grapheme-color synesthesia – a
condition characterized by perceptual experiences of anomalous
FIGURE 4 | Hypnotic suggestions divide as a function of type and content.These various hypnotic suggestions yield numerous hypnotic effects.
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FIGURE 5 | Balanced experimental design using instrumental hypnosis
where contrast between conscious suppression – i.e., stimulus is
present and consciousness is absent – and conscious hallucination –
i.e., stimulus is absent and consciousness is present – enable
targeting of neural correlates of consciousness.
combinations of cross-modal sensations (Cohen Kadosh et al.,
2009; however, see Anderson et al., 2014), and even temporar-
ily abolish co-occurrences of secondary sensory experiences in
synesthetes (Terhune et al., 2010).1 Indicating the reliability and
sustainability of these remarkable changes, hypnotically induced
alteration of color perception correlates with corresponding mod-
iﬁcations in neural response (Kosslyn et al., 2000; McGeown et al.,
2012). Speciﬁcally, neuroimaging results of hypnotically induced
altered perception show modulation of brain regions associated
with color processing – i.e., bilateral fusiform gyrus, primary
visual area (Kosslyn et al., 2000; McGeown et al., 2012). Impor-
tantly, this phenomenon raises intriguing questions regarding the
studyof subliminal processing, because such changes inperception
entail the suppression from consciousness of the actual sensory
event. For example, would suppressing green sensory input by
supplanting it with hypnotically induced hallucinations produce
green-related priming effects? The afﬁrmative would support the
subliminal processing of hypnotically induced suppressed content.
Such questions bear on the investigation of top-down-induced
subliminal processing. Recent neurophysiological investigations
found that alteration of color perception correlates with modula-
tions of neural oscillatory activity over posterior regions (Koivisto
et al., 2013). These modulations of neuronal responses submit
the idea of an early mechanism involved in probing the stored
mental representation of the suggested color and in the mod-
iﬁcation of the ensuing percept. Consistent with the idea that
hypnotic suggestions to alter color perception operate precon-
sciously, participants barely detect perceptual or sensory changes,
suggesting that these alterations precede conscious access (Kallio
and Koivisto, 2013). Suppression of sensory signals arguably pre-
cedes the global broadcast. Supporting this early top-down effect
on sensory input, event-related potentials indicate hypnotic mod-
ulations of primary visual components (i.e., P1 and N1; Raz et al.,
2005).
Hypnosis also modulates phenomenological aspects of con-
scious experience, such as pain perception (Patterson and Jensen,
2003; Jensen andPatterson,2006; Price andRainville,2013). Called
hypnotic analgesia, this phenomenon does not follow from the
release of endogenous analgesics (Goldstein and Hilgard, 1975) or
1Hypnotically induced blindness could represent another case of conscious sup-
pression, however the phenomenological status of these phenomena remains rather
ambiguous (Oakley and Halligan, 2009).
an increased state of relaxation (Miller et al., 1991). Instead, hyp-
notic analgesia arguably originates from various factors, including
the alteration of expectations relative to impending painful events,
as well as attentional and emotional regulation mechanisms
(Kiernan et al., 1995; Rainville et al., 1999a; Ploghaus et al., 2003;
Koyama et al., 2005; Price and Rainville, 2013). Hypnotic analgesia
triggers pain-related inhibitory neural mechanisms (Vanhauden-
huyse et al., 2009). Similar to color perception, these changes
in perception demonstrate how hypnosis elicits powerful effects
over perceptual experience. Brain imaging studies of this phe-
nomenon underline a dissociation between the somatosensory
cortex, involved in processing of nociceptive signals, and the
ACC, a region associated with conscious access to pain sensation
(Rainville et al., 1997, 1999b, 2002; Faymonville et al., 2000, 2003;
Hofbauer et al., 2001). Grounded in this functional dissociation
between sensory and affective components of pain (Rainville et al.,
1999a), current ﬁndings suggest that alteration of pain perception
can either proceed from direct interferences of sensory processing
(Hofbauer et al., 2001), akin to subliminal approaches, or by mod-
ulating conscious access to pain sensation (Rainville et al., 2002),
comparable to preconscious approaches. In line with this view,
neurophysiological results imply that hypnotic analgesia affects
early as well as late stages of nociceptive processing (De Pascalis
et al., 2008). Analogous to the color-hallucination paradigm, such
changes in pain perception raise important questions concerning
the effects of unconscious nociceptive processing on behavior. For
example, would unconscious processing of nociceptive stimuli still
instigate a level of discomfort? Moreover, in addition to analgesia,
hypnotic suggestions can also trigger functional pain – i.e., the
subjective experience of pain in the absence of a noxious stimulus
(Derbyshire et al., 2004). This functional aspect of hypnosis brings
about the experimental ability to compare, in a balanced design,
conscious perception in the absence of a stimulus and the lack of
conscious perception in the presence of a stimulus, in order to
effectively isolate the NCC (see Figure 5).
Memory and identity
Posthypnotic amnesia (PHA) represents memory lapses of events
that took place under hypnosis, after termination of hypnotic
induction (Kihlstrom, 1985, 1997; Barnier, 2002a). Affording
researchers with increased experimental control, these memory
deﬁcits contributed to the development of experimental research
on implicit cognition (Barnier et al., 2001). Importantly, prear-
ranged post-hypnotic cues induce recall, implying that memory
lapses mainly reﬂect the inability to access and retrieve stored
information rather than encoding and storage deﬁcits (Geiselman
et al., 1983; Kihlstrom, 1997). Hence, PHA putatively originates
from top-down failures to access and retrieve information, relat-
ing this phenomenon to preconscious approaches. The underlying
neurophysiological correlates of PHA involve the modulations of
attentional processes relative to access and selectionof stored infor-
mation (Allen et al., 1995; Schnyer and Allen, 1995). In addition,
compared to normal retrieval of stored information, PHA cor-
relates with decreased activity in the extrastriate and temporal
cortical regions, as well as increased activity in the rostral lat-
eral PFC (Mendelsohn et al., 2008). This reduced activity in the
temporal lobes likely reﬂects the incapacity to successful access
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stored information, as this brain region strongly associates with
long-term memory storage (Wixted and Squire, 2011). Hypothet-
ically, increased PFC activity could reﬂect the implementation of
hypnotic responses to actively hinder retrieval processes.
Past research shows that temporarily irretrievable material
inﬂuences behavior nonetheless (Kihlstrom, 1980; Spanos et al.,
1982; Kinnunen and Zamansky, 1996; Bryant et al., 1999; Barnier
et al., 2001). For example, reﬂecting the distinction between
explicit and implicit memory systems, performances of HHSs on a
word association task denote PHA-related priming effects despite
signiﬁcant deﬁcits on explicit recall (Kihlstrom, 1980; David et al.,
2000; Barnier et al., 2001). PHA experiments also reveal suppres-
sion of conscious access to episodic memory (Kihlstrom, 1997),
source memory (Evans and Kihlstrom, 1973; Evans, 1979), and
even autobiographical memory (Barnier and McConkey, 1999;
Barnier, 2002a,b; Cox and Barnier, 2003; Barnier et al., 2004).
Notably, suppression of access to autobiographical memories may
lead to signiﬁcant effects on personal identity (Barnier, 2002b).
These examples illustrate how PHA offers a unique framework
to test various hypotheses on the cognitive unconscious beyond
perceptual processing.
Contrary to PHA, few studies looked at the effects of hyp-
notic agnosia – i.e., the functional inability to access semantic
knowledge (Kihlstrom, 1997; Raz, 2011b). This research gap leaves
open numerous experimental possibilities to probe unconscious
semantic processing using hypnosis, stretching from the seman-
tic categories of inaccessible items to modality speciﬁc deﬁcits.
Furthermore, the case of hypnotic agnosia evokes an intriguing
paradox wherein the selective interference to access a particular
semantic content requires the ability to minimally identify that
content at some level – e.g., the hypnotically induced discrimi-
nating inability to recognize scissors, requires the tacit ability to
discriminate scissors from other objects. This phenomenon there-
fore demonstrates how top-down processingmay act through tacit
knowledge – i.e., knowledge in the absence of awareness.
Ideomotor response
Hypnosis can decouple volitions and actions (Halligan et al.,
2000; Blakemore et al., 2003; Ward et al., 2003; Cojan et al., 2009;
Cardeña et al., 2012; Coutlee and Huettel, 2012; Peter et al., 2012;
Deeley et al., 2013a,b, 2014; however, see Haggard et al., 2004).
Hypnotic suggestions directly targeted at the sense of control dis-
rupt willed actions and induce alien control. For example, during
involuntary arm levitation, responsive participants raise their arm
in the absence of conscious control (Blakemore et al., 2003). This
hypnotic effect reduces overall muscle activity (Peter et al., 2012)
and relates to signiﬁcant changes in the cerebellar-parietal net-
work (Blakemore et al., 2003). These results parallel brain-imaging
studies that report modulation of parietal activation during hyp-
notically induced paralysis, wherein participants experience the
inability to move a limb (Cojan et al., 2009; Cardeña et al., 2012;
Coutlee and Huettel, 2012; Deeley et al., 2013a). Investigating the
effects of hypnotic suggestion on the perception of voluntary and
involuntary movements, a recent neuroimaging study reports that
loss of perceived control correlates with decreased connectivity
between the supplementary motor area, associated with motor
planning, and the primary motor area (Deeley et al., 2013a). These
results suggest that decoupling the planning and the implementa-
tion of actions decreases the feeling of control during movements.
Additional results from this study also indicate that reduced con-
scious perception of involuntary actions correlates with decrease
neural activity of the parietal lobe, suggesting that modulation of
parietal activity relates more strongly with awareness of move-
ments than feeling of control. In a separate study, the same
research group investigated involuntary movements as a function
of locus of control (Deeley et al., 2014). Results show that induced
involuntary control may reﬂect various types of alien control and
modulations of agency. Thus, various strategies may interfere with
conscious access to feelings of control. Together, these ﬁndings
highlight how ideomotor suggestions elicit important interac-
tions between hypnotic response, awareness of movement and
locus of control. Moreover, they also show how conscious access
to the control of movements inﬂuences the phenomenology of
action.
Thought suppression and hypnotically induced clinical analogs
Intrusive cognitions and emotions often accompany psy-
chopathology (Wenzlaff and Wegner, 2000). In order to aid
patients, clinicians use hypnosis to suppress unwanted thoughts
(Bryant and Wimalaweera, 2006; Bryant and Sindicich, 2007).
Moreover, hypnotic suggestions can also numb the conscious per-
ception of unpleasant emotions (Bryant and Kourch, 2001; Bryant
and Mallard, 2002; Bryant, 2005; Bryant and Kapur, 2006; Bryant
and Fearns, 2007; Sebastiani et al., 2007). Experimental results
show that hypnotic numbing of emotions signiﬁcantly reduces
emotional and somatic responses to aversive stimuli (Bryant and
Kourch, 2001; Bryant and Mallard, 2002). Furthermore, empha-
sizing the accuracy of hypnotic suggestions, evidence also indicates
that emotional suppression solely interferes with affective dimen-
sions of cognition, leaving the cognitive content available for
conscious processing (Bryant and Fearns, 2007). Interestingly, an
experimental study investigated the interactions between masked-
induced and hypnotically induced suppression mechanisms.
Using a backward masking design, results show that hypnotically
induced emotional numbing suppresses subliminal processing
of masked aversive stimuli, thereby demonstrating that hyp-
notic suppression of emotions occurs at the unconscious level –
i.e., prior to global broadcast (Bryant, 2005). Hence, hypnotic
suppression acts early and can supersede subliminal processing.
Together, hypnotic suppression of thoughts and emotions pro-
vide a reliable and distinctive framework to investigate subliminal
processing.
In experimental psychopathology, hypnotic suggestions tar-
get speciﬁc functions and dramatically inﬂuence cognitions and
behaviors (Oakley, 2006; Cox and Barnier, 2010; Woody and
Szechtman, 2011; Bortolotti et al., 2012). For example, one study
used hypnosis to interfere with subjective feelings associated with
task completion and motivational security, producing obsessive-
compulsive-like behaviors in typical participants (Woody et al.,
2005). This study underlines the importance of conscious access to
certain affective signals in the phenomenology of even the utmost
mundane tasks – e.g., washing your hands. In the same vein,
hypnosis can also eliminate conscious access to selfhood-related
information, yielding mirrored-self misidentiﬁcation delusions –
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a monothematic delusion characterized by the inability to recog-
nize self-reﬂections in the mirror (Barnier et al., 2010; Connors
et al., 2012a,b, 2013). Evidence shows that this induced delu-
sion stems from faces recognition impairment (Connors et al.,
2012a, 2013). Critically, hypnotically induced mirror agnosia –
i.e., unavailability of knowledge about mirrors – also facilitates
the generation of mirrored-self misidentiﬁcation analogs (Con-
nors et al., 2012b). Aside from exploring new hypotheses, research
with hypnotically induced clinical analogs underlines the impor-
tance of conscious access to various sources of information, such
as sense of completion or selfhood-related recognition. From this
perspective, conscious suppressionnot only provides critical infor-
mation about the unconscious mind, but also helps to identify
the functional role of various processes related to consciousness
by looking at hypnotically induced maladapted behaviors and
delusions.
The ﬁelds of neuropsychology and behavioral neurology
often feature deﬁcits that are amenable to top-down inﬂuences
(Weiskrantz, 1986; Cowey, 2010; Overgaard, 2011) at different lev-
els (Marshall and Halligan, 1995; Fink et al., 1996). Experimental
accounts of hypnosis show how hypnotic suggestions can induce
reversible neuropsychological conditions – a form of behavioral
analog to TMS (cf., Raz and Wolfson, 2010). One example is visu-
ospatial hemineglect, where hypnotic suggestions to favor one
visual hemiﬁeld over the other lead to signiﬁcant decreases in
visual performance on the neglected side and neglect-like symp-
toms (Oakley andHalligan,2009, see supplementarymaterial; Raz,
2004; Priftis et al., 2011). In accordance with neuropsychological
ﬁndings that show distinctive levels of unconscious processing,
e.g., evidence fromvisuospatial neglect reveals processing of coarse
global representation in the absence awareness (Marshall and Hal-
ligan, 1995), hypnotically induced neglect can reliably expand this
line of research. Similar to prevailing preconscious approaches,
this research strategy underlines the experimental potential of
hypnosis to foster critical information about the link between
orienting of attention and visual awareness, and opens novel
avenues to investigate the preconscious processing of unattended
stimuli.
The experimental potential of hypnosis
Whether hypnosis acts through suppressive means or inﬂuences
attention to impede conscious access, this top-down method-
ological approach possesses formidable potential to study the
unconscious mind. Two general features make hypnosis a unique
approach. First, hypnotic suggestions afford researchers with a
wide spectrum of experimental possibilities. Second, whereas the
prevailing approaches either take advantage of perceptual limita-
tions or interfere with top-down ampliﬁcation processes, hypnosis
harness top-down processes to investigate both subliminal and
preconscious phenomena. Indeed, due to the variety of hypnotic
suggestions, hypnosis can prompt perceptual and attentional fail-
ures. Also, the accuracy of hypnosis (Raz and Michels, 2007)
allows researchers to selectively target mechanisms gating access
to consciousness.
As illustrated previously, hypnotic phenomena comprise
numerous brain systems, depending on the content of the hyp-
notic suggestion and the targeted function. Therefore hypnotic
suggestions act through various means: while certain suggestions
engage suppression mechanisms and yield subliminal process-
ing, other suggestions interfere with the deployment of top-down
ampliﬁcation and elicit preconscious processing (see Figure 1).
During hypnotically induced subliminal and preconscious pro-
cessing, hypnotic responses recruit frontal networks implicated
in top-down attentional regulation, control and monitoring pro-
cesses (Rainville et al., 1999b; Casale et al., 2012; Kihlstrom, 2013;
Oakley and Halligan, 2013). As mentioned previously, these brain
regions associate with the implementation of cognitive strate-
gies to successfully comply with hypnotic suggestions. Subsequent
neural effects putatively reﬂect the targeted function of the hyp-
notic suggestion (Oakley, 2008). For example, alterations of colour
perception correspond with signiﬁcant changes in the visual areas
(Kosslyn et al., 2000; McGeown et al., 2012) and oscillatory mod-
ulations of posterior brain activity 70 to 120 milliseconds post
stimulus onset (Koivisto et al., 2013). These results suggest the
presence of an early mechanism that supplants the actual rep-
resentation of sensory events with the suggestion-related stored
representation, subsequently producing alteration of perception
and suppressing sensory input. In addition, because hypnosis
supposedly elicits modiﬁcations of monitoring processes, per-
ceptual alterations could also involve modiﬁcations of reality
monitoring – i.e., the cognitive ability to assess the authentic-
ity of changes in perception (Bryant and Mallard, 2003, 2005).
Contemporary subliminal approaches and hypnotic approach
therefore encompass different suppression mechanisms. Whereas
the former exploits perceptual limitations, the latter use top-down
mechanisms to suppress conscious perception. Conversely, hyp-
notically induced preconscious processing resembles prevailing
preconscious approaches. For example, hypnotic responses can
also orient attention away from sensory events, thereby impeding
top-down ampliﬁcation of sensory signals (Raz, 2004; Oakley and
Halligan, 2009; Priftis et al., 2011). In addition, heightened mental
absorption during hypnosis (Rainville et al., 2002) could tax atten-
tional resources, triggering similar effects to the AB. In summary,
the hypnotic approach to elucidate unconscious processing rests
on a broad variety of mechanisms. This wide spectrum offers var-
ious experimental possibilities that overlap both subliminal and
preconscious processing.
Overall, the use of hypnosis to investigate the cognitive uncon-
scious compares favorably to contemporary methodologies (see
Figure 3): this approach applies to a broad range of visual andnon-
visual stimuli; works equally well for stimuli presented centrally
or peripherally; hardly necessitates temporal constraint relative to
the presentation of the stimulus or variation in sensory events.
Finally, various experiments imply the robustness of unconscious
hypnotic phenomena, even if the phenomenological dimensions
of hypnosis remain roughly deﬁned (Rainville and Price, 2003;
Jamieson, 2007). This approach also offer the following advan-
tages: ﬁrst, because it yields subliminal or preconscious processing
while keeping sensory inputs constant, this technique provides
researchers with greater experimental validity to isolate conscious
from unconscious processing. As mentioned previously, this fea-
ture invites direct comparisons between conscious processing and
unconscious processing without introducing confounding vari-
ables relative to changes in the sensory input. Second, hypnosis
www.frontiersin.org July 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 785 | 11
Landry et al. Hypnosis and the unconscious mind
may selectively suppress certain content from conscious experi-
ence – e.g., emotions – without altering the whole perceptual
experience. Thismethodological beneﬁt becomes particularly use-
ful in the context of concurrent presentations of sensory events.
In addition, hypnosis may harness the ecological beneﬁts of pre-
conscious approaches. Finally, this approach may also be used
in conjunction with other suppression methods; a feature that
expands themethodological possibilities through the various com-
binations it creates. Exemplifying this malleability, HHSs exhibit
distinctive response patterns to masked primes (Bryant, 2005).
In comparisons to other techniques, hypnosis therefore repre-
sents a valid and reliable instrument to probe the unconscious
mind.
Despite these beneﬁts, certain obstacles to the use of hypnosis in
the context of the suppression of consciousness might arise. Here
we address some of these concerns. First, HHSs are often carefully
selected in hypnosis experiments to demonstrate the full potential
of hypnotic suggestions (Hilgard, 1965), despite constituting only
10 to 15% of the population. This situation entails that interpreta-
tions of such experiments might not generalize and could merely
reﬂect certain psychological characteristics of this particular group
of individuals. A similar concern pertains to the fact that certain
scholars consider hypnosis as a speciﬁc form of altered conscious-
ness, which suggests that the effects of hypnosis might reduce to
this speciﬁc altered mental state, again hindering generalizability.
However, the notion that hypnosis implies a particularmental state
remains highly debatable (Kirsch and Lynn, 1995; Kirsch, 2011).
More importantly, both objections fail to apply to the instrumen-
tal approach, wherein hypnosis serves as an experimental tool to
investigate cognition, and do not focus on hypnosis by itself. In
the instrumental context, psychometric speciﬁcities of hypnosis
are typically disregarded because they hardly provide insight into
the model or hypothesis being tested. For example, the application
of instrumental hypnosis to investigate the notion of automaticity
proposes novel perspectives about this central psychological con-
struct regardless of psychometric characteristics of hypnosis (Raz
et al., 2002, 2005; Iani et al., 2006; Campbell et al., 2012; Lifshitz
et al., 2013). For this reason, questions about generalizability are
mostly irrelevant. A third concern follows from inter-individual
variability in hypnotic responses, an epistemological obstacle that
highlights the heterogeneous nature of responsiveness. Despite the
importance of taking this aspect into consideration, this variabil-
ity among individuals only calls for precautions when it comes to
interpreting the data. In addition, qualitative data could properly
assess and control for this variability. Indeed, a growing array of
interviewing techniques, such as the elicitation interview, provide
tools for identifying cognitive strategies (Vermersch, 1994; Le Van
Quyen and Petitmengin, 2002).
A ﬁnal concern pertains to the objective control of sub-
jects’ awareness, a central issue that transcends research
on conscious and unconscious processes (Seth et al., 2008;
Overgaard and Timmermans, 2010). Alongside subjective reports,
the subliminal and preconscious approaches typically control for
conscious perception by ensuring that unconscious-related per-
formances remain at chance level (Kouider and Dehaene, 2007).
These performance-based strategies, however, often miscalculate
conscious perception because subjective reports may vary while
objective measures stay constant (Lau and Passingham, 2006).
Optimally, research involving hypnosis requires two fundamental
contrasts: hypnotic versus non-hypnotic experimental conditions,
as well as HHSs versus LHSs. These comparisons provide the
means to properly screen for, measure the effects of, and thereby
bolster the effects of hypnotic suggestions (Mazzoni et al., 2013).
Subsequently, two pivotal strategies likely enable better control
of awareness. First, researchers may use concomitant objective
measures to the primary task. For example, during emotional
numbing, somatic measures corroborate emotional suppression
(Bryant andMallard, 2002). However, this strategy largely assumes
that concomitant objective measures represent a tight control for
subjective experience – an unwarranted assumption. Because they
rarely represent an infallible control of awareness (Sandberg et al.,
2010), concomitant objective measures only propose convergent
evidence. Second, researchers may control for hypnotic effects
using a secondary task; for example, Stroop (MacLeod, 1991) or
color-based digit detection (Cohen Kadosh et al., 2009) may con-
trol for alterations of color perception. In the absence of robust
control strategies, converging evidence from multiple measures
represents the best strategy to remedy this lacuna (Seth et al., 2008).
CONCLUSION
Here we herald instrumental hypnosis as a new experimental
vehicle to probe the structure and functioning of the cognitive
unconscious. Whereas most current techniques investigate the
unconscious mind via subliminal approaches that challenge our
perceptual limitations and preconscious approaches that rest on
inattention, the hypnosis lens facilitates both suppression and inat-
tention via top-downmechanisms. Beyond the empirical potential
to explore novel ideas and hypotheses, top-down control provides
scientists with increased experimental ﬂexibility by allowing target
processing of speciﬁc sensory events. Moreover, hypnotic hallu-
cinations provide an efﬁcient means to capture the NCC using a
full two-by-two balanced design allowing for a direct comparison
of conscious and unconscious conditions. Thus, scholars stand to
beneﬁt from the use of hypnosis in their quest to better under-
stand the underpinnings of the unconscious mind (Raz, 2011b).
Incorporating this tool into the armamentariumavailable to inves-
tigators of the cognitive unconscious will likely pave the road to
a more encompassing scientiﬁc understanding of this budding
ﬁeld.
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